Beneath the Fund: How Serious Capital Is Reading the Tokenization Forecasts
A forecasting spread from two trillion to thirty trillion dollars says less about tokenization’s ceiling than about how unevenly the market agrees on what to count.
A perspective from Open Doors Partners
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Institutional forecasts on the tokenized asset market by 2030 range from roughly two trillion dollars to thirty trillion dollars, an eightfold spread across firms that all have access to the same underlying data. Serious capital reads that spread differently than the headline number suggests it should be read. The gap is not a disagreement about whether tokenization scales. It is a disagreement about what belongs inside the count, and that distinction matters more to an allocator than any single endpoint does.
The Forecasts, Set Side by Side
McKinsey’s 2024 base case puts the tokenized asset market at approximately 1.9 to 2 trillion dollars by 2030, excluding stablecoins and central bank digital currencies, with an optimistic scenario reaching 4 trillion. Boston Consulting Group’s 2025 revision, produced jointly with Ripple, lands considerably higher: 9.4 trillion dollars by 2030, rising to 18.9 trillion by 2033, a compound annual growth rate of 53 percent. Citi’s 2023 forecast for tokenized digital securities sits between 4 and 5 trillion dollars. Standard Chartered’s broader projection, which folds in trade finance alongside financial securities, reaches 30 trillion dollars by 2034.
Set next to each other, the numbers look like disagreement. Read for methodology instead of headline, and they mostly agree. Every major forecast points the same direction and lands within a similar order of magnitude once stablecoins, tokenized deposits, and trade finance are either included or stripped out consistently. The forecast that looks most aggressive on its face, Standard Chartered’s, is also the one counting the most categories. The forecast that looks most conservative, McKinsey’s, is also the one counting the fewest. Serious capital treats the spread as a scoping exercise, not a debate about direction.
What the Market Actually Shows Today
Against those endpoints, the tokenized real-world asset market held somewhere between 27 and 60 billion dollars in value in early 2026, depending on which categories are counted. Present adoption represents well under one percent of any 2030 forecast. That gap between where the forecasts land and where the market sits today is the more useful number for an allocator to hold onto than the trillion-dollar figures themselves, because it is the one that says how much of this thesis is still unbuilt.
Why the Ceiling Isn’t the Constraint
Net asset value for a traditional fund is calculated once daily by an administrator and reported downstream. That cadence is sufficient when the only requirement is a quarterly report. It is not sufficient once a tokenized interest begins moving as collateral inside a smart contract, which requires price data continuously rather than once a day.
Oracle infrastructure, not the act of tokenizing an asset, has become the binding constraint on how far any of the forecasts above can actually be realized. RedStone’s acquisition in January 2026 of Security Token Market, which tracks more than 800 tokenized equities, real estate positions, debt instruments, and fund products carrying a combined market capitalization above 60 billion dollars, shows how much of the value chain now sits in continuous pricing and data rather than in issuance itself. Custody arrangements, redemption rights, and secondary trading venues remain largely bespoke rather than standardized, so each new tokenized vehicle carries its own plumbing rather than drawing on infrastructure others have already built.
Regulation compounds the constraint. The European Union’s MiCA framework has applied in full since December 30, 2024. The United States, as of mid-2026, still operates without a unified statute governing tokenized securities. That asymmetry shapes where issuance concentrates and which investors can reach which products, and it is a substantial part of why any of the 2030 forecasts depend as much on jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction infrastructure as on demand.
The Balance-Sheet Signal
The forecasts describe a market. The commitments describe what serious capital is actually willing to put behind it. Apollo has entered a cooperation agreement permitting it to acquire up to 90 million tokens in the Morpho lending protocol over 48 months, a position that would represent roughly 9 percent of the protocol’s governance token supply. Separately, Circle’s presale of the token underpinning its Arc blockchain, built for institutional finance, closed at 222 million dollars in May 2026 against a 3 billion dollar fully diluted valuation, with BlackRock and Apollo among more than a dozen institutional participants. A firm does not commit to a four-year token acquisition program, or write a check into a presale for a network without a live mainnet, to test a hypothesis. It does so because it has already read the forecasts, priced the disagreement in them, and concluded the rails are worth owning a stake in regardless of which endpoint proves correct.
What the Reading Settles, and What It Doesn’t
The direction is settled. Commitment at this scale, from managers of this size, answers that question on its own terms. What the forecasting spread does not settle is which layer of the private-markets stack absorbs the change first, whether oracle and custody infrastructure standardizes quickly enough to keep pace with issuance, and what happens to fund structures built for decades around the assumption that ownership transfer is inherently slow and permission-gated.
Reading the forecasts correctly means reading past the number at the top of each one. The two-trillion and the thirty-trillion estimates are not competing predictions. They are the same trend, measured with different rulers, against a market that has so far built less than one percent of what either ruler implies.
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Frequently Asked Questions
Why do tokenization forecasts for 2030 vary by a factor of fifteen? The variance comes almost entirely from scope, not from disagreement about direction. Forecasts that include stablecoins and tokenized deposits land far higher than forecasts that exclude them. Forecasts that fold in trade finance and physical assets land higher still. McKinsey’s conservative approach and Standard Chartered’s inclusive approach are measuring related but distinct things, not competing predictions of the same number.
What does tokenization actually change about a private-market investment? Tokenization represents an ownership claim, whether in a fund interest, a bond, or another private asset, as a transferable digital instrument recorded on a blockchain. It does not change the underlying asset or the fund structure holding it. It changes how the claim on that asset can move, be priced, and be used as collateral.
Why has real-world adoption lagged the forecasts by this much? Current tokenized real-world asset market size sits at roughly $27 billion to $60 billion, depending on scope, against 2030 forecasts in the trillions. The gap reflects unresolved infrastructure: continuous pricing (oracle systems), custody, redemption rights, and secondary trading venues are still being built vehicle by vehicle rather than to a shared standard, and regulatory frameworks remain uneven across jurisdictions.
Is tokenization a replacement for continuation vehicles and secondaries markets? No. Continuation vehicles and secondaries markets operate at the level of the fund. Tokenization operates at the level of the underlying ownership claim. The two are more likely to converge, with existing fund-structure tools eventually running on tokenized rails, than to displace one another.
What signals institutional conviction beyond the forecasts themselves? Balance-sheet commitments to the infrastructure layer are a stronger signal than any market-size projection. Apollo’s four-year agreement to acquire tokens in the Morpho protocol and its participation, alongside BlackRock, in Circle’s Arc blockchain presale are both commitments to the rails rather than to a single product, which is a different and more durable kind of conviction than a pilot program represents
Sources
- Tokenized asset market 2030 forecast (~$1.9–2T base case, $4T optimistic scenario): McKinsey & Company, “From Ripples to Waves: The Transformational Power of Tokenizing Assets,” June 2024
- Tokenized asset market forecast ($9.4T by 2030, $18.9T by 2033, 53% CAGR): Boston Consulting Group / Ripple, joint tokenization report, April 2025
- Tokenized digital securities forecast ($4–5T by 2030): Citi GPS, “Money, Tokens, and Games,” 2023, as referenced in comparative industry analysis
- Tokenization market forecast ($30T by 2034, broader scope including trade finance): Standard Chartered, tokenization market projection, as referenced in comparative industry analysis
- Current tokenized real-world asset market size (~$27–60B, early 2026) and US/EU regulatory asymmetry (MiCA fully applicable December 2024; no unified US statute as of mid-2026): Coinpaprika, “The $16 Trillion Tokenization Market Forecast Explained,” May 2026
- RedStone acquisition of Security Token Market (800+ tokenized products tracked, $60B+ combined market cap): RedStone / Crowdfund Insider, January 2026
- Apollo–Morpho cooperation agreement (up to 90 million tokens over 48 months, ~9% of governance token supply): Morpho Association, official announcement, February 2026
- Circle Arc token presale ($222M raised, $3B fully diluted valuation, BlackRock and Apollo among participants): CNBC, “Circle raises $222 million from BlackRock, Apollo and others in Arc token presale valued at $3 billion,” May 11, 2026
Open Doors Partners LLC | Registered Investment Adviser | This post is for informational purposes only and is not an offer or solicitation. Past performance is not indicative of future results. All investments involve risk, including loss of principal. Read full disclosures here.
